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I. Introduction 
The Copyright Alert System represents the newest venture by 
the contemporary intermediary regime to intensify copyright 
enforcement.  In July 2011, the Recording Industry Association of 
America (“RIAA”) and the Motion Picture Association of America 
(“MPAA”) signed an agreement with five major national internet 
service providers (“ISPs”)—AT&T, Cablevision, Comcast, Time 
Warner Cable, and Verizon.  This Memorandum of Understanding 
(“MOU”) details the creation of a Copyright Alert System (“CAS”), 
a new and entirely private mechanism for copyright enforcement.  
Under CAS, content rightsholders—composed most prominently of 
the RIAA and MPAA—monitor and notify ISPs of any internet 
protocol addresses (“IP addresses”) participating in peer-to-peer file 
sharing.  The ISPs utilize this information, and by referencing the 
customer registered to that IP address at the alleged time, issue the 
customer a Copyright Alert.  Alerts are graduated, with 
accompanying penalties that increase in severity. 
Prior to CAS, content rightsholders embarked on legal and 
legislative campaigns that, although highly successful in the courts, 
resulted in significant normative backlash—producing 
counterproductive results of continued file sharing and infringement.  
With the signing of the Copyright Alert System’s Memorandum of 
Understanding, content rightsholders seemed poised to make that 
same mistake again.   
However, in a prime example of “normative avoision,” content 
rightsholders have finally taken note of the normative consequences 
of their enforcement methods and, through subsequent changes to 
CAS, have deftly sidestepped the normative backlash dilemma.  
Content rightsholders have created a split enforcement regime that 
focuses litigation on frequent file sharers with deeply internalized 
pro-sharing norms, and pro-copyright education on nascent to 
moderate file sharers who have not yet deeply internalized pro-
sharing norms.  In light of content rightsholders recent litigation and 
legislative campaign debacles, the Copyright Alert System represents 
a new leaf for their pro-copyright efforts. 
II. Background 
A.  Normative Backlash 
In Copyright Backlash, Professor Ben Depoorter argues that 
punitive enforcement of copyright infringement statutes creates a 
normative backlash effect by strengthening anti-copyright positions: 
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[C]opyright enforcement is a double-edged sword. While 
stringent sanctions have a modest deterrent effect on file-
sharing behavior, they increase anti-copyright sentiments 
among frequent offenders. This raises a spectacular challenge 
for copyright enforcement: the more copyright owners push to 
step up sanctions for copyright infringements, the more the 
public resents the protected rights. Consequently, stepping up 
sanctions tends to increase—rather than decrease—the rate and 
frequency of infringing activities.1  
 
Professor Depoorter likens the conditions that copyright law 
faces today to those encountered at times in the past, such as under 
Prohibition the early twentieth century.2  The concept of a normative 
backlash can be summed up as follows: where noncompliance is 
widespread, effective deterrence can only be obtained by raising 
enforcement to levels that undermine the support for the underlying 
rules.3  A slightly different formulation highlights the normative 
elements in a backlash scenario: “[w]hen behavior is driven by 
normative viewpoints, imposing laws that are perceived as ‘unjust’ or 
‘illegitimate’ [may] reinforce and strengthen the underlying 
opposition against those laws.”4  The public may, for example, 
perceive laws as unjust if the associated sanctions seem excessive in 
relation to the punished behavior.5  Under these conditions, 
enforcement has the unintended and counterproductive effect of 
moving behavior in the opposite direction from that intended by the 
law.6 
Professor Depoorter applies the normative backlash structure to 
modern copyright enforcement and finds that content rightsholders’ 
deterrence-based litigation approach will likely prove 
counterproductive to the goals of copyright holders.7  Professor 
Depoorter finds the necessary elements for normative backlash 
present in the widespread noncompliance fueled by normative 
viewpoints, in the heightened legal campaign against noncommercial 
 
 1.  Ben Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (2011). 
 2.  Id. at 1269. 
 3.  Id. at 1252. 
 4.  Id. at 1269. 
 5. Id. 
 6.  Id. at 1252. 
 7. Id. at 1256.  
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users, and in the public’s “adverse reaction to the strict enforcement 
of copyright law.”8 
First, noncompliance is widespread in the online file sharing 
context.  A 2003 Gallup Poll survey found that 83% of teenagers 
believed sharing digital music was morally acceptable.9  At the same 
time, a substantial portion of the public views the current statutory 
damages framework as excessive, unjust, and punitive—far above and 
beyond actual compensatory damages.10    For example, in Sony BMG 
Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, a graduate student was ordered 
to pay $675,000 for sharing 30 songs—$22,500 per song.11  In Capitol 
Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, a single mother was ordered to pay 
$1.92 million for sharing 24 songs.12  Yet despite these sky-high 
penalties, file sharing has continued, largely unabated.13  A 2011 study 
by Sandvine reports that BitTorrent is still responsible for 21.6% of 
residential Internet traffic in North America.14  Compare this to the 
top result for residential Internet traffic—Netflix at 22.2%,15 and it 
becomes apparent that online infringement has not slowed.16  Thus, 
 
 8. Depoorter, et al., supra note 1, at 1266 
 9. Steven Hanway & Linda Lyons, Teens OK With Letting Music Downloads Play, 
GALLUP POLL, Sept. 30, 2003, available at http:// www.gallup.com/poll/9373/teens-letting-
music-downloads-play.aspx. 
 10.  See Pamela Samuelson & Ben Sheffner, Debate, Unconstitutionally Excessive 
  Statutory Damage Awards in Copyright Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 53 
(2009).  But see Colin Morrissey, Note, Behind the Music: Determining the Relevant 
Constitutional Standard for Statutory Damages in Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 3059 (2010) (arguing that the statutory damages framework was not 
intended to be punitive but remunerative of actual damages). 
 11.  Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 489 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 12.  Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1050 (D. Minn. 
2010). 
 13.  See Simon Crerar, Illegal File-Sharing As Popular As Ever, TIMES (London), Jan. 
19, 2006, available at http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/arts/music/article2418137.ece; 
Enigmax, File-Sharing Prospers Despite Tougher Laws, TORRENTFREAK.COM (May 22, 
2012), http://torrentfreak.com/file-sharing-prospers-despite-tougher-laws-120522. 
 14. Janko Roettgers, Sorry, Hollywood: Piracy may make a comeback, GIGAOM.COM 
(Aug. 11, 2011, 2:02 PM), http://www.gigaom.com/2011/08/11/file-sharing-is-back 
(“[P]iracy never actually declined.  It just didn’t grow as fast as other types of media 
consumption.”).  Netflix is the single largest source of Internet traffic on North America’s 
fixed access networks at 22.2%.  Id; see also Sandvine, GLOBAL INTERNET PHENOMENA 
SPOTLIGHT NORTH AMERICA, FIXED ACCESS, SPRING 2011 at 2, available at http://www. 
wired.com/images_blogs/business/2011/05/SandvineGlobalInternetSpringReport2011.pdf 
[hereinafter “Sandvine Report”]. 
 15.  Sandvine Report at 2. 
 16.  Mike Masnick, File Sharing Continues To Grow, Not Shrink, TECHDIRT.COM 
(Aug. 12, 2011, 11:45 AM), www.techdirt.com/articles/20110812/01061715485/file-sharing-
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noncompliance has been, and continues to be, widespread in the 
online infringement context. 
Second, over the past decade, content rightsholders, most 
notably the entertainment industry, have waged a largely successful 
legal campaign to heighten the enforcement and punishment for 
online copyright infringement.  In a series of high-profile decisions, 
content rightsholders have persuaded courts “to accept expansive 
interpretations of contributory enforcement, to create novel doctrines 
of copyright infringement, and to apply broad interpretations of 
statutory damage provisions.”17  According to copyright backlash 
theory, it is the very success of this legal campaign, and the ever-
higher sanctions it imposes on the public, that may fuel a 
counterproductive normative backlash. 
In Copyright Backlash, Professor Depoorter conducted a number 
of experimental studies to explore the potential for counterproductive 
normative effect on various types of infringers.18  By varying the 
probability and severity of monetary sanctions,19 Professor Depoorter 
determined that a counterproductive effect on pro-copyright 
sentiments existed in relation to the probability and severity of 
sanctions.20  Increasing either the probability or the severity of 
sanctions produced a counterproductive effect.  Moreover, increasing 
both the probability and severity of sanctions produced a “powerful 
counterproductive effect, increasing anti-copyright norms.”21  Finally, 
Professor Depoorter found that elevated sanctions have a stronger 
effect on deterrence than increasing the probability of sanctions.  
Significantly, however, elevated sanctions also generated greater 
backlash effects.22 
Because the marginal benefits of increasing the severity of 
punishment is greater than the equivalent increase in the probability 
of punishment, Professor Depoorter suggests that it will be more 
financially efficient for content rightsholders to increase the severity 
 
continues-to-grow-not-shrink.shtml (“None of the actions taken by the industry appear to 
have slowed down infringement online.  Instead, it appears that it just keeps growing.”). 
 17.  Depoorter, et al., supra note 1, at 1251.  This article explores the successful 
litigation campaign and the concept of legal overdeterrence below in Part II.B. 
 18. Id. at 1279–80. 
 19. Id. at 1280. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. (“[H]igh-severity/low-probability enforcement conditions generate higher 
backlash effects as well as higher levels of deterrence than low-severity/high-probability 
enforcement—even though, interestingly, both enforcement regimes impose identical 
expected costs.”). 
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of sanctions.23  However, in what Professor Depoorter dubs “the irony 
of deterrence,” increasing the severity of sanctions also strengthens 
anti-copyright norms in the public.24 
Professor Depoorter’s concluding remarks offer a potential 
solution to content rightsholders: “[E]nforcement efforts would likely 
be more effective if targeted specifically to different types of 
copyright offenders.  . . . By focusing litigation on frequent offenders, 
copyright holders bolster anti-copyright norms among this group, 
while foregoing opportunities to promote pro-copyright norms among 
occasional infringers.”25  And indeed, content rightsholders have 
taken the concept of normative backlash to heart when developing 
and implementing the Copyright Alert System.26 
B.  The Litigation Campaign by Content Rightsholders 
Content rightsholders have largely succeeded in ratcheting ever-
higher copyright enforcement within the court system.  First, content 
rightsholders have expanded the scope of copyright protection 
through intermediary liability.  Second, content rightsholders, and in 
particular the RIAA and MPAA, have aggressively pursued 
individuals for what historically has been deemed noncommercial 
copying.  Finally, content rightsholders have prevailed upon courts to 
apply expansive and severe statutory penalties against these private 
individuals for online copyright infringement.27 
First, content rightsholders have greatly expanded the scope of 
copyright protection through intermediary liability.  When online file 
sharing became prevalent in the late 1990s, the legality of online, 
noncommercial file sharing was still uncertain.  In the pivotal case of 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the Ninth Circuit departed from 
conventional noncommercial fair use theory to find Napster users 
directly infringed the plaintiffs’ copyrights.28  Once the court found 
that noncommercial file sharing by private users could qualify as 
direct infringement, the path was inevitably paved towards 
intermediary liability for the developers of file sharing platforms.  
The Ninth Circuit found the developers of the Napster software liable 
 
 23.  Depoorter, et al., supra note 1, at 1286.   
 24.  Id. at 1286. 
 25.  Id. at 1289. 
 26. See infra Part V. 
 27.  See generally Depoorter, et al., supra note 1. 
 28.  A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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under a theory of contributory liability.29  By centrally hosting the 
database of shared files on its users’ computers, Napster provided the 
“site and facilities” enabling the direct infringement, and therefore 
“materially contributed” to their users’ copyright infringement. 
The Supreme Court would expand the bounds of intermediary 
liability even further in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.30  In 
Grokster, the defendant did not centrally host files or databases that 
would qualify as the “site and facilities” necessary to meet the 
contributory liability test under Napster.31  Nonetheless, the Court 
found the intermediary liable by creating a novel doctrine of 
inducement.32   Under this new inducement theory, the Court held 
that mere distribution of software with the intent to promote copyright 
infringement creates secondary infringement liability.33 
Second, content rightsholders have aggressively pursued 
individuals for what historically has been deemed noncommercial 
copying.  As online file sharing continued to skyrocket in the early 
2000s, the RIAA began targeting the individual users of file sharing 
technologies and doing so en masse.  In September 2003, the RIAA 
began sending subpoenas to file sharers via their ISPs, eventually 
settling most cases via pre-litigation letters for approximately $3,000.34  
By 2008, the RIAA sued roughly 35,000 persons for online file 
sharing.35  The MPAA entered the fray in 2004 when it launched its 
own lawsuits against individual sharers.36  The litigation campaign 
against individuals thus seems to have grown exponentially.  For 
example, in 2012, one movie studio sued almost 25,000 individual 
users in a single case.37 
 
 29.  A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1020.  
 30.  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005). 
 31.  Id. at 919–20. 
 32. Id. at 936–37. 
 33.  Id. (“[O]ne who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to 
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster 
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”). 
 34.  Depoorter, et al., supra note 1, at 1260. 
 35.  See Ethan Smith & Geoffrey A. Fowler, Ganging Up on Internet Pirates 
Hollywood: Telecom Providers Unite to Target Those Who Share  
Copyrighted Films, WSJ.COM (July 8 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052702303365804576432270822271148. 
 36. Fred Locklear, MPAA lawsuits target BitTorrent, eDonkey and Direct Connect 
networks, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 14, 2004, 5:33 PM), http://arstechnica.com/ 
uncategorized/2004/12/4467-2/. 
 37. Sarah Jacobsson Purewal, ‘Hurt Locker’ Studio Sues 2,514 Over Copyright 
Infringement, PCWORLD.COM (Apr. 24, 2012, 7:41 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/ 
article/254381/hurt_locker_sue_2_514_over_copyright_infringement.html (“Voltage 
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Contents rightsholders have also hurdled considerable obstacles 
in obtaining judgments against individuals.  The evidentiary issue of 
proving that a file in a shared folder was actually downloaded from 
the alleged file sharer’s computer is one such example.  However, the 
courts haven given short shrift to the issue by ruling that 
dissemination could be presumed based on mere accessibility.38  This 
evidentiary presumption enabled content rightsholders to pursue a 
number of questionable claims.  For example, in 2005 the RIAA sued 
a deceased 83-year-old woman whose daughter alleged she “hated 
computers.”39  As a result of these and other actions, critics have 
characterized content rightsholders’ litigation campaigns as akin to 
blackmail, extortion, and harassment.40   
Finally, content rightsholders have prevailed upon courts to 
interpret statutory damage provisions exceedingly broadly against 
private individuals for online copyright infringement.  The Copyright 
Act provides for copyright holders to elect for statutory damages at 
any time during litigation. 41  For “willful infringement” of registered 
works, a court may increase the award of damages to a sum of 
$150,000 per instance of infringement of a copyrighted work.42  By 
convincing courts to interpret “willful infringement” broadly, content 
rightsholders have successful obtained astonishingly high damages 
against online file sharers.43  For example, one individual was ordered 
to pay $1.92 million for sharing 24 songs and another $675,000 for 30 
songs.44 
Here too, content rightsholders have handily overcome 
evidentiary issues of damages through alternative statutory damages.  
 
Pictures, the movie studio that gained its fame by producing the Academy Award-winning 
film “The Hurt Locker” and targeting 24,583 BitTorrent users in a piracy-related lawsuit 
last year, is on another copyright infringement crusade.”); see also Voltage Pictures, LLC 
v. Vazquez, 277 F.R.D. 28, 31 (D.D.C. 2011) (action brought against named defendants 
and Does 1–24,583). 
 38. Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1222. 
 39.  Andrew Orlowski, RIAA Sues the Dead, REGISTER (U.K.) (Feb. 5, 2005, 2:30 
AM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/02/05/riaa_sues_the_dead/. 
 40.  See, e.g., Nate Anderson, The “Legal Blackmail” Business: Inside a  
P2P-Settlement Factory, WIRED (Oct. 3, 2010, 10:30 AM), http://www. 
wired.com/epicenter/2010/10/the-legal-blackmail-business. 
 41. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012).   
 42.  Id. 
 43.  See generally Kate Cross, David v. Goliath: How the Record Industry Is Winning 
Substantial Judgments Against Individuals for Illegally Downloading Music, 42 TEX. TECH 
L. REV. 1031, 1042 (2010). 
 44.  See Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 660 F.3d at 490; Capitol Records, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 
1050. 
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For instance, a traditional damages analysis might be nuanced enough 
to inquire into how many times a file was downloaded and whether a 
download correlates to a lost sale for the rightsholder.  Such an 
analysis, though complex because of the nature of online file sharing, 
would be strongly indicative of the actual harm to the copyright 
holder.45  
III.  The Copyright Alert System 
A.  Memorandum of Understanding 
On July 6, 2011, a group of content rightsholders—the MPAA, 
the RIAA, an association of independent record labels,46 and a 
number of film production companies47—met with five of the largest 
Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”)—AT&T, Cablevision, Comcast, 
Time Warner Cable, and Verizon—and signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (“MOU”) that outlined a Copyright Alert System 
(“CAS”) designed to combat online peer-to-peer file sharing (“P2P” 
file sharing).48  Under the CAS MOU, content owners identify and 
notify ISPs of infringing Internet Protocol addresses (“IP” addresses) 
along with the time and date the alleged infringement took place.49  
ISPs then cross-reference that data with their own internal databases 
to determine which subscriber’s account was assigned that IP address 
at the relevant time.50  The ISP then sends an Alert to that 
subscriber.51  These Alerts constitute a graduated response system 
that includes “temporary reductions of Internet speeds, redirection to 
a landing page until the subscriber contacts the ISP to discuss the 
matter or reviews and responds to some educational information 
about copyright, or other measures that the ISP may deem necessary 
to help resolve the matter.”52 
 
 45.  See generally Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 746–49 (2003). 
 46. Represented by the American Association of Independent Music (“A2IM”).  
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, Center for Copyright Information 2 (July 6, 2011), 
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Memorandum-of-
Understanding.pdf [hereinafter MOU]. 
 47. Represented by the Independent Film and Television Alliance (“IFTA”).  Id. at 2. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. David Kravets, Copyright Scofflaws Beware: ISPs to Begin Monitoring Illicit File 
Sharing, WIRED (Oct. 8, 2012, 4:10 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/10/isp-
file-sharing-monitoring/. 
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Actual implementation of CAS began as of March 2013—almost 
two years since the MOU was signed by the parties and more than 
five years since initial dialogue and negotiations first began.53  As a 
result, most of the scholarship heretofore in the area of CAS has been 
speculatively based on the guiding MOU.54  Having laid the 
groundwork of how CAS came about in Part II, Part III will discuss 
the MOU as originally signed and highlight significant lines of 
criticism.  Part III will discuss the recently publicized implementation 
methodology, as detailed by signatories of the MOU. 
1.  The Center for Copyright Information 
Section Two of the Memorandum of Understanding delineates 
the creation of the Center for Copyright Information (“CCI”), which 
is the private entity charged with the design and management of a 
Copyright Alert System.55  Additionally, CCI is tasked with educating 
the public about copyright law, online infringement, and the civil and 
criminal consequences of such infringement.56 
CCI is governed by a six-person Executive Committee.57  Three 
committee members are selected by content rightsholders, and three 
committee members are selected by the participating ISPs.58  Initial 
funding for CCI is also split fifty-fifty between the two groups.59  
However, there is no public interest or copyright expert 
representative on the Executive Committee.  Instead, the MOU 
creates a separate three-person Advisory Board “drawn from 
relevant subject matter experts and consumer interest communities.”60 
As with the Executive Committee, the Advisory Board is 
essentially co-governed.  Content rightsholders and ISPs each select 
one Advisory Board member, and the two selected Advisory Board 
 
 53. Congressional Internet Caucus Advisory Committee, Congressional Internet 
Caucus Meets on Copyright and Piracy, C-SPAN.org (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.                  
c-span.org/Events/Congressional-Internet-Caucus-Meets-on-Copyright-and-Piracy/107 
37438657-1 (Jill Lesser presenting). 
 54. See, e.g., Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response American Style: “Six Strikes” 
Measured Against Five Norms, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 28 
(2012); generally Mary LaFrance, Graduated Response by Industry Compact: Piercing the 
Black Box, 30 CARDOZO ARTS. & ENT. L.J. 165 (2012). 
 55. MOU, supra note 46, at 3. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 4, 14. 
 60. Id. at 3–4. 
Winter 2014]                   NORMATIVE AVOISION 11 
members select a mutually agreeable third member.61  The Executive 
Committee is obliged to consult with the Advisory Board on any 
“significant issues” it is considering regarding the design and 
implementation of CAS.62  Notably, the Advisory Board provides 
only nonbinding “recommendations” to the Executive Committee.63 
The MOU envisions that CCI will also retain an Independent 
Expert—an “impartial technical expert” that would review on an 
ongoing basis the methodology of CAS and make recommendations 
“with the goal of ensuring and maintaining confidence on the part of 
the Content Owner Representatives, the Participating ISPs, and the 
public in the accuracy and security of the Methodologies.”64  Like the 
Advisory Board, the Independent Expert’s recommendations are 
confidential and nonbinding on the Executive Committee.65  “Failure 
to adopt a recommendation of the Independent Expert [does] not 
amount to a breach under [the MOU].”66  This includes those 
instances where a particular Content Owner’s methodology is found 
to be “fundamentally unreliable.”67  
If a Content Owner Representative Methodology is found by the 
Independent Expert to be fundamentally unreliable, the Independent 
Expert may issue a confidential finding of inadequacy only to that 
particular content owner.68  Notification to participating ISPs,69 
wrongfully suspected subscribers, or other Content Owners using or 
contemplating similar methodologies is not required.70 
2.  The Six Strikes Structure 
The escalating six-alert structure of CAS is modeled in theory 
after the French HADOPI71 and Irish Eircom72 graduated response 
 
 61. MOU, supra note 46, at 3. 
 62. Id. at 4. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 5. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 5. 
 69. It is uncertain based on the MOU whether the Independent Expert may disclose a 
finding of fundamental inadequacy to just the content rightsholder or also to affected ISPs.  
See id.  However, participating ISPs other than those ISPs directly affected are expressly 
restricted from notice.  Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Lawmakers adopt Internet anti-piracy bill, FRANCE24.COM (May 13, 2009), 
http://www.france24.com/en/20090512-lawmakers-adopt-internet-anti-piracy-bill-illegal-
downloading-France. 
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systems.  Under the MOU, content rightsholders send notices of 
infringement to a subscriber’s ISP.73  These notices assert ownership 
and infringement of a copyrighted work by a subscriber of the ISP 
and contain technical information necessary for the ISP to identify 
the subscriber (e.g., IP address, date, and time).74  ISPs receive the 
notice, match the alleged infringing transaction to their subscriber 
using the IP address at the relevant time, and generate an alert.75  Of 
note, ISPs are not required to generate alerts above a certain 
undisclosed notice volume.76  Moreover, ISPs have discretion to 
temporarily stop processing or reduce the number of ISP Notices 
processed if in the sole discretion of the ISP, the resulting demand on 
their systems and resources becomes unreasonable.77  Justifications 
for finding such an unreasonable demand are remarkably broad and 
include disproportionate impact on (1) business processes and 
systems, on (2) customer service departments arising from subscriber 
inquiries regarding CAS, and any (3) “other demands on the 
Participating ISP’s businesses processes and systems” that “must be 
given precedence.”78  Thus, individual ISPs have incredible discretion 
in how many notices they choose to process and therefore how many 
alerts ultimately are sent to subscribers. 
Upon processing a valid notice of infringement, ISPs generate 
and send one of six escalating copyright alerts to the subscriber.  The 
six alerts can be divided into three categories: educational measures, 
acknowledgement measures, and mitigation measures.79  The first two 
copyright alerts fall under the umbrella of educational measures.80  
These alerts are informative in nature and do not require a response 
or acknowledgement from the subscriber.  They explain that 
copyright infringement is illegal, that there are lawful methods of 
obtaining copyrighted content, and that continued infringement will 
 
 72. Nate Anderson, Irish ISP agrees to disconnect repeat P2P users, ARS TECHNICA 
(Jan. 28, 2009, 11:10 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/01/irish-isp-agrees-to-
disconnect-repeat-p2p-users/. 
 73. MOU, supra note 46, at 6. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 7. 
 76. Id.  (“[E]ach Participating ISP shall not be required to exceed the notice volumes 
pertaining to its Copyright Alert Program as established in Section 5 of this Agreement.”). 
 77. Id. at 16. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 8. 
 80. Id. 
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result in imposition of sanctions in the form of the mitigation 
measures.81 
The third and fourth copyright alerts are best characterized as 
acknowledgement measures.  These alerts require acknowledgement 
of receipt but do not require the user to “acknowledge participation 
in any allegedly infringing activity.”82  Acknowledgement does, 
however, require that the subscriber agree to immediately stop and/or 
instruct others using the subscriber’s account to stop any infringing 
content.83  The method of acknowledgement may be in the form of a 
temporary landing page requiring a click-through acknowledgement 
for subsequent online access; in a pop-up notice that persists 
concurrently with online access until a click-through 
acknowledgement; or in any other format deemed “reasonable” in 
the judgment of that ISP.84   
The last class of copyright alerts, the mitigation measures, are 
triggered in the fifth and sixth alerts.  As with the third and fourth 
copyright alerts, these alerts require acknowledgement of receipt and 
after a fourteen day notice period, apply one of several measures:  a 
temporary reduction in bandwidth speed, a temporary step-down in 
service tier, a temporary redirection to a landing page until subscriber 
contacts an ISP customer service representative or completes 
“educational instruction on copyright,” a temporary suspension of 
Internet access, or any other temporary mitigation measure designed 
by an ISP that is “designed to be comparable.”85  Note that after the 
sixth alert has been sent, the ISP is not obligated to send further alerts 
to the subscriber but must keep count of additional notices sent from 
content rightsholders.86  Additionally, the alert system effectively 
resets once an ISP does not receive a notice relating to a subscriber’s 
account within twelve months from the last notice.87 
3.  Appeal Process 
Before any mitigation measure in the fifth and sixth copyright 
alerts is applied, the subscriber has fourteen days to appeal via a 
 
 81. MOU, supra note 46, at 8. 
 82. Id. at 10. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 11–12. 
 86. Id. at 13. 
 87. Id.  (“The ISP must “expunge all prior ISP Notices and Copyright Alerts from the 
Subscriber’s account.”). 
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nonjudicial dispute resolution program.88  The appeal process, known 
as the “Independent Review Program,” is initiated by a subscriber 
upon receipt of a mitigation alert and payment of a $35 dollar filing 
fee.89  Each appeal is decided by an individual “independent 
reviewer” selected by an Administrating Organization from a panel 
of neutral reviewers.90  The legal principles applied in the independent 
review process is the “prevailing law as determined by United States 
federal courts,” including such concepts as fair use.91  These principles 
are determined for all independent reviewers by an “independent” 
copyright expert, who is suggested by the Administrating 
Organization and approved by the CCI Executive Committee.92 
The MOU allows for just six limited grounds for review of a 
mitigation measure alert:  (1) account misidentification; (2) 
unauthorized account use; (3) authorized content use; (4) fair use; (5) 
file misidentification; and (6) work published before 1923.93  Under 
the appeal process, the subscriber carries the burden of proof to 
disprove a presumption of infringement.94 
B.  Critiques of the Original MOU 
The original Memorandum of Understanding was undoubtedly 
written with the goal in mind of giving CCI substantial discretion in 
setting up the implementation of the Copyright Alert System.  
Despite this fact, numerous criticisms of the MOU and CAS in 
general have abounded.  This Part will focus on five potential issues 
in the MOU:  (1) education as a goal; (2) the power of the advisory 
board; (3) the neutrality of the Independent Expert and the 
Copyright Expert; (4) the severity of mitigation measures; and (5) the 
limited defenses in the Independent Review Process.95 
First, one of the many goals of Copyright Alert System and CCI 
includes “educat[ing]” consumers.96  The MOU requires that CCI 
 
 88. MOU,  supra note 46, at 14, 30. 
 89. Id. at 30. 
 90. Id. at 31. 
 91. Id. at 35. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 26. 
 94. Id. at 27. 
 95. This review will be particularly succinct given the “updated” CAS 
implementation that deviates somewhat from the original MOU. 
 96.  MOU, supra note 46, at 2 (The goals of the Copyright Alert System and CCI 
include “providing education, privacy protection, fair warning, and an opportunity for 
review that protects the lawful interests of consumers.”). 
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develop and host online educational programs designed to “inform 
the public about laws prohibiting [o]nline [i]nfringement and lawful 
means available to obtain digital works online and through other 
legitimate means.”97  Because CAS has often been characterized as 
“private legislation,” it is especially important that any “educational” 
materials be accurate and provide neutral information.  Critics have 
expressed doubt about CCI’s ability to educate the public in an 
unbiased fashion.   
A review of CCI’s website in late 2012 is telling and reinforces 
those doubts.  If the official CAS website is an indication of the type 
of education materials to be bundled with alerts and mitigation 
measures, then CAS will be replete with big-media rhetoric.  The 
educational resources available lack a balanced and objective 
viewpoint, and resemble indoctrination more than education. 
At the time, the CAS website contained a “facts” section that 
listed a number of curious and outlandish dangers associated with 
peer-to-peer file sharing.  For example, file sharing places “sensitive 
data” such as “personal health information,” “financial records,” and 
“classified documents” at risk.98  File sharing “means viruses . . . 
spyware and malware.”99  CCI also appealed to the universal refrain 
to “save the children” when it alleged that CAS was a way for 
children to be protected because parents cannot “know everything 
that kids are viewing or downloading.”100  Such “education” could 
apply equally as well to the use of standard email and therefore 
should not be considered relevant within the goals and ambit of CAS, 
CCI, and the MOU. 
CAS further utilizes the “copyright infringement as theft” 
rhetoric that the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected.  In its 
facts section, CCI states:  “[O]nly 40 percent of Americans 
understood the serious legal consequences associated with the 
distribution of copyrighted content.  That compares with the 78 
percent who understood the serious legal consequences of shoplifting 
a DVD from the local video store.”101  In direct contrast, the Supreme 
Court has stated that “infringement plainly implicates a more 
complex set of property interests than does run-of-the-mill theft, 
 
 97. MOU, supra note 46, at 4. 
 98.  Facts, COPYRIGHTINFORMATION.ORG, http://www.copyrightinformation.org/facts  
(last visited May 12, 2012) (Note that the page has since been taken down.). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. (emphasis added). 
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conversion, or fraud.”102  If CCI and its independent expert on 
copyright believe this is an accurate description of “prevailing legal 
principles,” then “education” in the MOU truly means anything but. 
Similarly, CCI declared that “copyright harms the economy,” 
destroyed 373,000 American jobs, and deprived states of “badly 
needed . . . tax revenue.”103  Such language is reminiscent of big media 
rhetoric and shows considerable bias in ignoring the causative versus 
correlative issues inherent in such a statement.  Obviously, a 
multitude of factors could have resulted or contributed to a loss of 
jobs in the entertainment industry, including the recent global 
recession of 2008. 
Second, the Advisory Board wields very little substantive power 
by the terms of the MOU.104  There is no guarantee of any role for the 
Advisory Board in decisions it may deem “significant” unless the 
Executive Committee also considers such an issue “significant.”105  
The Executive Committee could therefore exclude the Advisory 
board simply by declining to find a particular decision “significant.”  
The Advisory Board has no veto power, even if unanimous in its 
decisions.  Furthermore, there is a lack of process information 
concerning how long Advisory Board members serve or if they could 
be replaced by the Executive Committee or parties to the MOU.106  In 
short, under the terms of the MOU, the Advisory Board has the 
potential to act as nothing more than a public relations construct to 
which CCI can attribute efforts to “protect the lawful interest of 
consumers.”107 
Third, the MOU does not ensure the neutrality or the 
effectiveness of the Independent Expert and the independent 
copyright and privacy experts who are to review the CAS 
methodology and establish the legal principles under which the 
Independent Review Process will take place.  Any recommendations 
these experts make are confidential and nonbinding.108  The Executive 
Committee need not attempt to comply with these recommendations 
nor to document their reasoning behind such a decision, such as in a 
rudimentary cost-benefit analysis.  Moreover, the Advisory Board has 
no material authority with regards to expert selection: CCI’s 
 
 102. Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 218 (1985). 
 103. Facts, supra note 98. 
 104. LaFrance, supra note 54, at 169–171; Bridy, supra note 54, at 28. 
 105. LaFrance, supra note 54, at 169–171. 
 106.  Id. at 170. 
 107.  See MOU, supra note 46, at 1–2. 
 108.  See id. at 5. 
Winter 2014]                   NORMATIVE AVOISION 17 
Executive Board, i.e., the parties to the MOU, has the sole discretion 
to choose these experts.109  Lastly, there is no provision that precludes 
CCI from replacing any experts with whom they disagree.  Thus, as 
with the Advisory Board, the Executive Committee of CCI has 
arranged for expert resources to be at its disposal but has 
handicapped those very same experts from performing their duties. 
Fourth, the severity and proportionality of the mitigation 
measures has been met with considerable and widespread disapproval 
in the public eye.  Under the MOU, ISPs may suspend a subscriber’s 
access during the fifth and sixth Mitigation Alerts.110  An ISP may also 
terminate the access of a subscriber who receives a Mitigation Alert 
or further ISP Notices after a Mitigation Alert.111  Civil liberties 
groups have expressed concern that CAS could result in the denial of 
basic rights to access.  The importance of Internet access in today’s 
world means “your access to the world’s information and also your 
right to speak to the world.” 112  Accordingly, “it would be wrong for 
any ISP to cut off subscribers’ Internet access, even temporarily, 
based on allegations that have not been tested in court.” 113  In short, 
denying access to what is already or is developing into a basic right 
should require proper due process and depend on assertions triable in 
a court or other governmental adjudication.114 
Fifth, the Independent Review Process allows for just six limited 
grounds for review of a mitigation measure alert:  (1) account 
misidentification; (2) unauthorized account use; (3) authorized 
content use; (4) fair use; (5) file misidentification; and (6) work 
published before 1923.115  Generally, these limited defenses have been 
criticized as overly narrow and restrictive, especially in light of the 
presumption of infringement.116  For example, Annemarie Bridy notes 
that in an account misidentification defense, “copyright owners under 
the MOU enjoy a rebuttable presumption of correctness as long as 
their method of capturing IP addresses was not found to be 
 
 109.  MOU, supra note 46, at 5. 
 110.  Id. at 12. 
 111.  Id. at 7, 9, 13. 
 112.  Smith & Fowler, supra note 35 (quoting Jay Stanley, a senior policy analyst with 
the ACLU in Washington). 
 113. David Sohn, ISPs and Copryight Owners Strike a Deal, CENTER FOR 
DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY (July 7, 2011), http://www.cdt.org/blogs/david-
sohn/isps-and-copyright-owners-strike-deal. 
 114. Id. 
 115. MOU, supra note 46, at 26. 
 116.  See Bridy, supra note 54, at 34–37; LaFrance, supra note 54, at 175–179. 
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‘fundamentally unreliable’ by CCI’s independent technical expert.”117  
Mary LaFrance finds significant omissions in that the listed grounds 
for review “do not even come close to encompassing the range of 
lawful uses for P2P file-sharing.”118 LaFrance has compiled a list of 
omitted legal grounds for noninfringement that should likewise apply 
to the CAS Independent Review Process, including fair use, works 
with copyrights forfeited due to publication without notice, and 
authorization by a licensee of the content in question.119  For instance, 
under CAS, a work qualifying as fair use in an infringement suit, such 
as a parody, satire, mash-up or commentary, could trigger a Notice 
and Mitigation Alert, since a substantial portion of the work could 
consist of copyrighted content.120  In such cases, the subscriber should 
be entitled to assert fair use, in any shape or form accepted by federal 
courts, as valid grounds for appeal. 
The CAS MOU essentially set forth a broad set of guidelines 
that CCI would be held to operate within.  Much ink was spilled 
considering the ramifications of the MOU as a guiding document, but 
until March 2013 when the Copyright Alert System entered active 
implementation,121 little was known about how CAS would operate in 
practice. 122 
C.  Above and Beyond the Original MOU 
 
The “[The Copyright Alert System] has the potential to be an 
important educational vehicle that will help reduce peer-to-peer 
online copyright infringement.  Whether it will meet that 
promise or instead will undermine the rights of Internet users 
will depend on how it is implemented.”123 
 
Despite the MOU being signed by all parties in July 2011, details 
about the specific implementation of CAS, including its Notice 
discovery methodology as well as its Independent Review Process, 
were largely unavailable prior to when CAS was in fact rolled out by 
CCI in March 2013.  This Part will summarize the new information on 
 
 117. Bridy, supra note 54, at 35. 
 118. LaFrance, supra, note 54, at 176. 
 119. Id. at 177. 
 120. Id. at 174. 
 121. See FIRST AMENDMENT TO MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 1, 
COPYRIGHTINFORMATION.ORG, http://www.copyrightinformation.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2013/02/CCI-MOU-First-Amendment.pdf (last visited May 1, 2013).  
 122. Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 904–05 (2012). 
 123. Sohn, supra note, at 113. 
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CAS released primarily in a Congressional Internet Caucus Advisory 
Committee meeting and in a U.C. Hastings Conference on the 
Copyright Alert System.124Additionally, this Part will focus primarily 
on MPAA methodology, as provided by MPAA Senior Vice 
President Marianne Grant.125   
The CAS methodology involves, sequentially:  notice generation; 
notice validation; ISP alert discretion, generation, and conveyance; 
and the Independent Review Process.  During the notice generation 
phase, content rightsholders will employ an independent contractor 
(“Scanning Vendor”) to monitor peer-to-peer (“P2P”) online file 
sharing.  That Scanning Vendor, announced to be MarkMonitor Inc., 
will monitor and search for online file sharing via the BitTorrent 
protocol. 126 
Content rightsholders will provide a database of titles, focusing 
primarily on recent and popular works, to the Scanning Vendor.  This 
database will contain titles, keywords, and unique digital IDs 
embedded in the content—allowing the Scanning Vendor to properly 
ascertain whether a file shared is in fact on the list of monitored titles.  
The Scanning Vendor operates simply as a peer node in the P2P 
network, although virtual servers will enable the Scanning Vendor to 
operate many peer nodes concurrently.  While acting as a peer node, 
the Scanning Vendor will then record and connect to the list of peers 
sharing content. 
Prior to packaging and submitted the Notice to an ISP, the 
Scanning Vendor must verify the content and the infringer.  In order 
to verify the content, the Scanning Vendor uses a hashing algorithm127 
to create a ‘digital fingerprint” of the shared file.  If the hash is new to 
the database, the Scanning Vendor downloads the entire file for 
 
 124. Congressional Internet Caucus Advisory Committee, supra note 54 (MPAA Vice 
President Marianne Grant describing the Copyright Alert System as currently 
implemented); UC Hastings Conference on Copyright Enforcement in the Digital Age: The 
Copyright Alert System, UC Hastings College of the Law (Mar.  29, 2013) [hereinafter, 
U.C. Hastings Conference]; Sarah Laskow, The new copyright alert system is running, 
CJR.ORG (Feb. 28, 2013, 3:30 PM), http://www.cjr.org/cloud_control/cas_system_ 
already_in_action.php?page=all&print=true. 
 125. U.C. Hastings Conference, supra note 125. Nevertheless, Grant has assured the 
public that the RIAA methodology is substantially similar.  Id. 
 126. On behalf of the RIAA, MarkMonitor will also monitor Gnutella and other P2P 
platforms other than BitTorrent.  Id. 
 127. “A hash function is any algorithm or subroutine that maps data sets of variable 
length to data sets of a fixed length.” Hash Function, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en. 
wikipedia.org/wiki/Hash_function (last visited Nov 17, 2013). 
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manual verification.128  During manual verification, a person watches 
and reviews the file, comparing its content, size, etc. to a master file.  
If the hash is already in the database, the file is presumed verified. 
In order to “verify” the infringer—i.e., confirm that the alleged 
infringer is actually uploading pieces of the content in question—the 
Scanning Vendor utilizes rudimentary network diagnostic tools such 
as ping and traceroute to ensure that the IP address is “live” at that 
time.  Presumably, this step addresses the proven risk of innocent 
persons being framed as infringers.129  For example, researchers were 
“able to generate hundreds of DMCA takedown notices for 
[computers at the University of Washington] that were not 
downloading or sharing any content.”130  Once the content and IP 
address are verified, the Scanning Vendor packages the evidence—
including date, time, IP, ping and traceroute results, and shared 
content files or pieces—and delivers it to the ISP that controls that 
particular IP address. 
The ISP uses the IP address and date and time records to match 
the Notice to one of their Subscribers.  At this point, the ISP 
determines whether or not the seven-day grace period following a 
previous Alert is in effect.  If a grace period is not in effect, the ISP 
generates and sends an Alert to the Subscriber. 
In the case that the Alert is the fifth or sixth Mitigation Alert, the 
Subscriber has the option of pursuing an appeal via the Independent 
Review Process.  The information available regarding the 
Independent Review Process remains largely the same as during the 
signing of the MOU, except for two items.  First, the MOU was 
amended in October 2012 to include provisions that allowed the 
voiding of previous Copyright Alerts, if an appeal of the fifth 
Mitigation Alert is successful.  Second, the Administrating 
Organization for the Independent Review Process has been selected.   
The American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), an established and 
respected dispute resolution organization, will be overseeing the 
Independent Review process.  The choice of AAA will contribute to 
 
 128. The RIAA does not employ manual verification, relying instead on automated 
audio fingerprinting tools.  U.C. Hastings Conference, supra note 125. 
 129. Michael Piatek, Tadayoshi Kohno, & Arvind Krishnamurthy, Challenges and 
Directions for Monitoring P2P File Sharing Networks –or– Why My Printer Received  
a DMCA Takedown Notice, 1-3, available at http://dmca.cs.washington.edu/dmca_hot 
sec08.pdf 
 130. Id. at 1. 
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the perception that CCI truly intends for the Independent Review 
Process to be fair and neutral.131 
IV. The Proposal: Normative Avoision 
Content rightsholders have spearheaded a legal campaign that, 
though highly successful in the courts, has resulted in significant 
normative backlash and overall has been counterproductive to their 
intended goal of increased copyright enforcement.  With the signing 
of the Copyright Alert System’s Memorandum of Understanding, 
content rightsholders seemed poised to make that same mistake 
again.  Fortunately, it appears as though the content industry is 
coming to realize that normative overdeterrence is causing more 
harm to its business than good.132  In its many significant changes to 
the Copyright Alert System since the signing of the Memorandum of 
Understanding, CCI and by extension content rightsholders, have 
deftly handled the very real threat of a normative backlash. 
In the copyright litigation campaign, widespread noncompliance 
fueled by normative viewpoints and overdeterrent enforcement 
resulted in a “copyright backlash” that undermined support for 
content rightsholders’ pro-copyright goals.133  With the Copyright 
Alert System, that same widespread noncompliance remains 
present.134  And initially, content rightsholders drafted CAS in a way 
reminiscent of their overdeterrent litigation campaign.135  In doing so, 
rightsholders ran the very real risk of once again creating normative 
backlash effects that would frustrate their goal of reducing file sharing 
infringement.  However, following hard on the heels of failed pro-
copyright legislative endeavors, a popular shift in normative 
awareness and values has taken place.136  In response, content 
rightsholders have finally taken note of the normative consequences 
 
 131. LaFrance, supra note 54, at 182. 
 132.  See Peter S. Menell, Infringement Conflation, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1578 (2012) 
(“The recording industry has come to recognize that mass enforcement is causing more 
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sanctions are counterproductive for deterring file sharing of copyrighted works). 
 133. See supra Part II.A. 
 134. See supra Part II.A 
 135. See supra Part III.B. 
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of their enforcement methods and, through subsequent changes to 
CAS, have deftly sidestepped the normative backlash dilemma. 
A.  The Normative Shift 
In the last three years, several unsuccessful legislative campaigns 
spearheaded by content rightsholders have brought to light for the 
general public the fact that copyright law is sometimes driven by the 
self-interested efforts of the content industry.137  The seminal example 
occurred in late 2011, just after the parties to CAS signed the MOU.  
Content rightsholders introduced the Stop Online Piracy Act 
(“SOPA”) in the Congressional House of Representatives.   
Opposition to the bill was powerful and occurred in speed and 
numbers never before seen.138  Mark Lemley derided the bills as 
“pos[ing] grave constitutional problems and . . . potentially disastrous 
consequences for the stability and security of the Internet’s 
addressing system, for the principle of interconnectivity that has 
helped drive the Internet’s extraordinary growth, and for free 
expression.”139  Wikipedia, Google, Facebook, Twitter, and over 7,000 
other websites protested by “blacking out” their services as a 
demonstration against the potential censorship embodied in SOPA.140  
Three million people emailed Congress to voice their opposition, and 
more than four million signed a petition opposing SOPA.141  In the 
resulting groundswell, lawmaker after lawmaker renounced support 
for the legislation, and the bill was subsequently dropped from 
consideration.142 
 
 137. Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 7 (2010). 
 138. Timothy B. Lee, SOPA protest by the numbers: 162M pageviews, 7 million 
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 139. Mark Lemley, et al., Don’t Break the Internet, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 34 
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internet. 
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www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2088860/SOPA-protest-4-5m-people-sign-Googles-
anti-censorship-petition.html (“Wikipedia’s ‘blackout’ protest against the U.S. anti-piracy 
bills SOPA and PIPA has ignited a wave of protest around the world – and up to 18 
senators have publicly withdrawn support for the anti-piracy bills, after 7,000 sites ‘blacked 
out’, and protestors took to the streets in New York.”). 
 141. Id. See also Jenna Wortham, Public Outcry Over Antipiracy Bills Began as Grass-
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Post-SOPA, the public began to pay more attention to the legal 
and legislative campaigns of content rightsholders.  A significant 
portion of the public began to believe that their social norms were not 
reflected in existing copyright law.143  Critics assessed the copyright 
landscape and found that a handful of outsized content intermediaries 
lobbied fiercely “to arrive at copyright laws that enrich[] established 
copyright industries at the expense of both creators and the general 
public.”144  Jessica Litman observed that “[c]opyright lobbyists have 
not shown that recent enhancements to copyright have made it easier 
or more rewarding for readers, listeners, and viewers to enjoy 
copyrighted works.”145 
In the public debate that followed, a number of pro-copyright 
enforcement arguments were shown to be lacking.  Content 
rightsholders’ contention that the “sky is falling”—that new 
technologies were destroying established content industries and 
eliminating all incentives to create—is a prime example.  Several 
studies came to light that questioned the data cited by content 
rightsholders to support their claims.  In its April 2010 report on 
“Intellectual Property: Observations on Efforts to Quantify the 
Economic Effects of Counterfeit and Pirated Goods,” the 
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) questioned the metrics 
and methodology used to support the existence of a growing file 
sharing problem.146  The GAO investigation found that the reported 
damages to the American economy “[could not] be substantiated or 
traced back to an underlying data source or methodology.”147  A 2012 
study showed that U.S. consumers spent more on entertainment 
today than they did 10 years prior.148  Conflicting anecdotal evidence 
from some content rightsholders also painted the pro-copyright 
movement in a favorable light.  Indeed, Jim Griffin, a former head of 
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technology at Geffen Records candidly noted that “[i]n the history of 
intellectual property, the things we thought would kill us are the 
things that fed us.”149  Peter Yu explains that these new technologies 
have generally “open[ed] up new markets for [the content 
rightsholders’] products and services.”150 
Additionally, the rise and prevalence of file sharing today has 
enabled an upsurge in the number of remix and mashup works, and 
consequently the popularity of such works.151  Unsurprisingly, the 
public has, at least at the margin, internalized the pro file sharing 
norms enabling remixed works. 
Furthermore, though content rightsholders’ have long claimed 
that copyright infringement is tantamount to theft,152 the Supreme 
Court has stated that copyright infringement is fundamentally 
different than theft because a copyright infringer neither “assumes 
physical control” nor “wholly deprive[s] its owner of use.”153  Some 
content rightsholders’ have gone so far as to mischaracterize court 
decisions as “consistently rul[ing] personal file sharing is a copyright 
infringement and therefore . . . a crime.”154 
Instead of sympathizing with content rightsholders’ file-sharing-
as-theft rhetoric, the public has started to consider that “right holders 
should start by abandoning their old business models and adapting 
them to the new digital reality.”155  Increasingly, the public is 
displaying a willingness to adopt new and innovative legitimate 
services—combinations of “technical innovation, [convenient] access 
to the underlying delivery mechanisms, and reasonable licensing 
terms”—as solutions within their normative viewpoints and that 
therefore “serve musicians, rights-holders, and music fans.”156  Netflix 
and Spotify, buffet-structured online streaming platforms for video 
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and music respectively, are highly successful examples of the public 
adopting licensed content platforms, within this normative structure. 
Thus, content rightsholders’ face the difficult proposition of 
trying to increase effective copyright enforcement via the Copyright 
Alert System in an environment which has recently seen the tide flow 
in favor of pro file sharing social norms.   
B.  Avoiding a Normative Backlash 
Between the time of the original parties signing the MOU and 
the implementation of CAS today, content rightsholders have 
changed much in the structure, methodology, and standards of the 
Copyright Alert System.  To be sure, CCI has done much to dispel 
the many criticisms associated with the original MOU.157  First, this 
Part will address the success with which CCI has addressed these 
critiques, many of which are deeply supported in the new normative 
framework.  Second, this Part examines content rightsholders’ split 
enforcement regime—separately targeting uninitiated versus frequent 
file sharers—and proposes that such a system abides well within the 
new normative shift.  Accordingly, content rightsholders’ new 
Copyright Alert System may very well prove successful, increasing 
enforcement in such a way as to minimize normative backlash 
amongst the majority of the general public. 
In Part II.B. this article reviewed five potential issues in the 
original MOU:  (1) education as a goal, (2) the power of the advisory 
board, (3) the neutrality of the Independent Expert and the 
Copyright Expert, (4) the severity of mitigation measures, and (5) the 
limited defenses in the Independent Review Process.  As CAS goes 
into active implementation, CCI has arguably addressed three of 
these issues. 
First, and perhaps most significant as it reflects on the integrity of 
CAS, the “education” rhetoric has been significantly amended.  In a 
March 2013 panel for the Congressional Internet Caucus Committee, 
CCI Executive Director Jill Lesser emphasized CCI’s focus not on 
enforcement and punishments but on neutral education and 
“chang[ing] attitudes.”158  Lesser noted that the CCI website, and 
especially the educational “fact” section, had been significantly 
improved.159  Gone is the language characterizing file sharing as 
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outright criminal “theft.”160  Gone are the threats that file sharing 
“means” viruses, spyware, and malware.161  Gone is the appeal to 
“save the children” through CAS.162  Instead, the CCI site focuses 
primarily on what copyright is,163 how CAS works,164 and where to find 
convenient and legal access to content.165 
Second, CCI is (slowly) moving to correct a blunder in which it 
hired arguably biased firm Stroz Friedberg as its “Independent” 
Technical Expert.  On October 18, 2012, CCI announced that Stroz 
Friedberg would serve as the CAS Independent Technical Expert.166  
Days later, news outlets broke the story that the firm Stroz Friedberg 
had formerly been a lobbyist for the RIAA.167  CCI “drew immediate 
fire from critics who rightfully questioned the firm's ability to be truly 
independent in light of its past paid advocacy for corporate rights 
owners.”168  CCI promptly responded by announcing that they would 
hire another expert to review Stroz Friedberg’s initial evaluation of 
the CAS methodology.169  Here, CCI’s quick response does much to 
allay concerns about the legitimacy of CAS.170 
Third, CCI has repeatedly declared that termination of a 
subscriber’s service is not required and is not the ultimate goal of 
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CAS. 171  CCI leaves the specific choice and implementation of 
Mitigation Measure up to the ISP.172  Cablevision is the only major 
ISP that will completely suspend (for 24 hours) customers’ Internet 
service.  Verizon is the only ISP that will cap customers’ data speeds 
under CAS.173  Thus, CCI has placated criticisms of normatively unfair 
and disproportionate sanctions, such as complete termination of basic 
rights of access to the Internet. 
Admittedly, CCI has not addressed the power of the Advisory 
Board or the limited defenses available in the Independent Review 
Process.  On the whole, however, CCI has made some effort to 
address and stay within the ambits of the new normative shift.  
Accordingly, at least for the majority of the public, the level of 
enforcement associated with the Copyright Alert System is likely not 
excessive enough to trigger a normative backlash. 
However, content rightsholders recognize that this normatively 
compliant version of CAS will likely not “be able to deal with the 
hard-core infringers” and “is not likely to change that behavior.”174  
Content rightsholders have reserved the possibility that [content 
rightsholders] would sue those it suspected of habitual piracy, as it did 
roughly 35,000 people between 2003 and 2008.”175  Content 
rightsholders have thus effectively adopted a split enforcement effort 
that focuses litigation on frequent file sharers with deeply internalized 
pro-sharing norms, and pro-copyright education on nascent to 
moderate file sharers who have not yet deeply internalized pro-
sharing norms. 
And so this article comes full circle to Professor Depoorter’s 
suggestion to content rightsholders in Copyright Backlash:  
“[E]nforcement efforts would likely be more effective if targeted 
specifically to different types of copyright offenders.”  Content 
rightsholders have listened.  This new split enforcement regime, 
consisting of the Copyright Alert System and reserved litigation, has 
the potential to not only avoid a normative backlash effect but to 
promote pro-copyright norms among occasional infringers.  In light of 
content rightsholders recent litigation and legislative campaign 
debacles, the Copyright Alert System represents a new hope for their 
pro-copyright efforts.  
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C.  Issues Beyond Backlash 
Though this concludes the normative backlash and normative 
avoision analysis, this article does not suggest that all substantive 
issues with the Copyright Alert System have been resolved.  For 
example, questions remain regarding the validity of CAS as “private 
legislation,”176 whether ISPs are sufficiently adversarial to content 
rightsholders to ensure safeguards for the public,177  the government’s 
role in pushing ISPs towards a private solution for content 
rightsholders,178 and whether the process from start to continued 
implementation is sufficiently transparent.179  These questions persist 
but exist outside the scope of this article. 
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V.  Conclusion 
Previously, content rightsholders spearheaded a legal campaign 
that, though highly successful in the courts, has resulted in significant 
normative backlash and overall has been counterproductive to their 
intended goal of increased copyright enforcement.  With the signing 
of the Copyright Alert System’s Memorandum of Understanding, 
content rightsholders seemed poised to make that same mistake 
again.  In a prime example of what this article has termed “normative 
avoision,” content rightsholders have finally taken note of the 
normative consequences of their enforcement methods and, through 
subsequent changes to CAS, have deftly sidestepped the normative 
backlash dilemma.  
Content rightsholders’ split enforcement regime—separately 
targeting uninitiated versus frequent file sharers—proposes a system 
that abides well within the new normative shift. Content rightsholders 
have thus effectively adopted a split enforcement effort that focuses 
litigation on frequent file sharers with deeply internalized pro-sharing 
norms, and pro-copyright education on nascent to moderate file 
sharers who have not yet deeply internalized pro-sharing norms.  
Accordingly, content rightsholders’ new Copyright Alert System may 
very well prove successful, increasing enforcement in such a way as to 
minimize normative backlash amongst the majority of the general 
public.  In light of content rightsholders recent litigation and 
legislative campaign debacles, the Copyright Alert System represents 
a new hope for their pro-copyright efforts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
